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By BRIENNE WESOLEK*
EVERY YEAR IN THE United States, over 450,000 babies are born
prematurely.' Of those preterm births, 1.4%, or over 6500, are classi-
fied as very low birth weight, weighing less than 15,000 grams.2 Over
the last several decades, dramatic advancements in neonatal technol-
ogy have improved the survival rate for infants born preterm, creating
a shift in the philosophy of care from noninterventionist to aggressive
treatment.3 Despite these medical improvements, decisions concern-
ing the care of extremely premature infants are especially difficult be-
cause prognosis is nearly impossible to determine.4 The birth of an
infant at or before twenty-five weeks of gestation or weighing less than
750 grams presents a gray area of uncertainty with regards to treat-
* Class of 2006. I would like to thank my Bioethics Professors, John J. Paris, S.J., at
Boston College and John M. Adler at the University of San Francisco School of Law.
1. See National Center for Health Statistics: Birthweight and Gestation, http://www.
cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/birthwt.htm (last visitedJul. 11, 2005) [hereinafter National Center].
The length of a normal pregnancy or gestation is considered to be forty weeks (280 days)
from the date of conception. Infants born before thirty-seven weeks gestation are consid-
ered premature. See Dr. Joseph F. Smith Medical Library: Prematurity, http://www.chcli-
brary.org/micromed/00061790.html (last visited Jun. 22, 2005).
2. The average birthweight in 2002 was 3332 grams. See National Center, supra note
1.
3. See Hastings Ctr. Special Project, Imperiled Newborns, 17 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5, 7-8
(Arthur Caplan & Cynthia B. Cohen eds., 1987) [hereinafter Imperiled Newborns].
4. See id. at 6.
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ment and prognosis 5 because the expected outcomes for survivors
span the entire range of severe handicap to normal.
The two dimensions concerning the treatment of premature in-
fants are questions of substance and questions of procedure. Substan-
tively, the question is whether all babies should be treated, and if not,
which babies should be treated. Procedurally, the question is who
should make the treatment decisions.6 Over the last three decades, a
combination of litigation, legislation, and real life experience has cre-
ated a consensus on this very sensitive, serious, and complicated ethi-
cal issue.7 In making treatment decisions regarding seriously ill
newborns, the appropriate standard to use is the best interest of the
child, as determined by the parents after informed discussion with
their doctor.8
This Note analyzes the recent Texas Supreme Court decision,
Miller v. HCA, Inc.,9 which failed to apply the best interest of the child
standard in dealing with the treatment of a critically ill premature in-
fant with an uncertain prognosis. Miller was wrongly decided and thus
should not be used as a model for treatment decisions for preterm
very low birth-weight infants. Making decisions in a child's best inter-
est is the agreed upon standard by the medical community and the
United States Supreme Court.10 Nevertheless, the Miller court's crea-
tion of the emergent circumstances exception to the need for in-
formed consent threatens the best interest of the child standard. This
Note further argues that the proper approach to making decisions in
a child's best interest is an individualized approach. This gives the par-
ents the primary decision-making authority after receiving compre-
5. See Amer. Acad. of Pediatrics Comm. on Fetus and Newborn & Amer. Coll. of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists Comm. on Obstetric Practice, Perinatal Care at the Threshold
of Viability, 96 PEDIATRICS 974, 974-75 (1995) [hereinafter Perinatal Care].
6. See Imperiled Newborns, supra note 3, at 8.
7. See John J. Paris, Ethical and Legal Issues in Assisted Ventilation of Newborns, in AS-
SISTED VENTILATION OF THE NEWBORN 81 (Jay Goldsmith ed., 4th ed., 2003) [hereinafter
Ethical and Legal Issues].
8. See, e.g., President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Med. and Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life Sustaining Treatment: A Re-
port on the Ethical, Medical and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions, 220 (United States
Government Printing Office 1983) [hereinafter President's Conm'n]; Comm. on Bioethics,
Amer. Acad. of Pediatrics, Guidelines on Forgoing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 93 PEDIAT-
Rics 532-36 (1994); John J. Paris & Michael D. Schreiber, Parental Discretion in Refusal of
Treatment for Newborns, 23 CLINICS PERINATOLOGY 573 (1996) [hereinafter Parental
Discretion].
9. 118 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. 2003).
10. See, e.g., President's Comm'n, supra note 8, at 220; Comm. on Bioethics, Amer. Acad.
of Pediatrics, supra note 8, at 532-36.
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hensive information, making it more likely that the best interest of the
child will be considered.
Part I of this Note defines the best interest standard and the three
categories in which to place infants regarding treatment decisions.
Part II discusses the facts of Miller and the trial, appellate, and Su-
preme Court decisions. Part III analyzes and rejects the Miller decision
because, in holding that emergent circumstances create an exception
to the general rule of liability for a physician who treats a minor with-
out parental consent, the best interest of the child was not the central
consideration in whether or not to treat Baby Sidney.'1 Part IV
presents decision-making guidelines and applies them to the Miller
case, arguing that an individualized approach with decision-making
based on a child's potential for relationship is the most appropriate
approach to making decisions in the best interest of the child.' 2
I. Background
A. The Development of the Best Interest Standard
The best interest standard has traditionally been employed by
courts in making child custody determinations or decisions involving
placement of an infant or child. 13 This standard, however, has not
always been used for decision-making regarding treatment of critically
ill infants, mainly because infants are unable to express their
interests.14
Duff and Campbell's 1973 essay, "Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the
Special Care Nursery,"15 brought these issues to the public's eye for the
first time. Duff and Campbell proposed that parents should be the
11. See John J. Paris, The "Emergent Circumstances" Exception to the Need for Consent: The
Texas Supreme Court Ruling in Miller v. HCA, 24J. PERINATOLOGY 337, 339 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter Emergent Circumstances].
12. This Note recognizes the sanctity of life, the dignity and worth of every human
being, and is sensitive to the special vulnerability that the unborn and newborns are sub-
jected to in society. Therefore, no arguments will be presented for the discontinuation of
treatment based on the philosophy that seriously ill newborns are not deserving of the
status of "personhood" in the ordinary or legal sense of the term and do not possess a right
to care from others. See e.g., Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 37,
51 (1972) (arguing that infanticide is a morally acceptable practice because infants do not
possess a right to life); James Bandler, Furor Follows Princeton Philosopher, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 27, 1999, at Al (describing Peter Singer's philosophy that animals have a greater right
to life than infants because they are more self aware).
13. Imperiled Newborns, supra note 3, at 15.
14. See John Paris & Eric Kodish, Ethical Issues, in NEONATOLOGY FOR THE CLINICIAN,
532 (Jeffery J. Pomerance & C. Joan Richardson eds., 1993) [hereinafter Ethical Issues].
15. See id.
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only ones to decide whether or not to employ an aggressive level of
treatment for their child because the consequences fall on the fam-
ily.1 6 Their article was published just as the emerging discipline of
bioethics began to question the ethics and legality of treatment prac-
tices.' 7 The article, however, was criticized by bioethicistJohn J. Paris,
S.J. as "normless" because there were no guidelines, no standards, and
no norms on which to base the decision. 18 "It could equally be made
on concern for siblings or 'family convenience' as on the best interest
of the infant."' 9
A 1977 study by Shaw and colleagues found that an overwhelming
majority of pediatricians and pediatric surgeons in the United States
would omit surgery on a Down Syndrome infant having congenital
heart disease, letting the infant die if the parent's so wished.20 How-
ever, that consensus ended when the "Bloomington Baby Doe" con-
troversy of 1982 received vast media attention. 21 The parents and the
attending obstetrician had agreed to forego surgical intervention for
an infant with Down Syndrome and esophageal atresia, which could
be corrected by a simple operation. 22 Although the Shaw study indi-
cated that this type of decision-making was standard during the late
1970s, when brought to the public's attention public outcry led to fed-
eral involvement through regulations.2 3 Newborn nurseries and neo-
natal intensive care units receiving federal funds were required to post
notice of a hotline number to report cases of discrimination in treat-
ment based on handicap. 24 When reports came in, "Baby Doe squads"
were dispatched to hospitals to determine whether treatment was
16. Raymond S. Duff & A.G.M. Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care
Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890, 894 (1973).
17. SeeJohn A. Robertson, Extreme Prematurity and Parental Rights After Baby Doe, HAS-
TINGS CTR. REP. 32, 32 (July-Aug. 2004) [hereinafter Extreme Prematurity].
18. See Ethical and Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 82.
19. Id.
20. See A. Shaw et al., Ethical Issues in Pediatric Surgery: A National Survey of Pediatricians
and Pediatric Surgeons, 60 PEDIATRICS 588, 590 tbl.4 (1977) (stating that 85% of the pediatric
surgeons and 65% of the pediatricians responding said they would follow the parents'
wishes).
21. See Ethical Issues, supra note 14, at 532.
22. See id.
23. See Office of the Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Nondis-
crimination on the Basis of Handicap, 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (Mar. 7, 1983) (interim final rule
modifying 45 C.F.R. § 84.61). See also Office for Civil Rights, Department of Health and
Human Services, Discrimination Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or
Nourishment; Notice to Health Care Providers, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (May 18, 1982) (apply-
ing 45 C.F.R. Part 84 to health services for handicapped children).
24. See Extreme Prematurity, supra note 17, at 33; Ethical Issues, supra note 14, at 532.
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inappropriately denied.25 The pediatric and hospital community suc-
cessfully sued to invalidate the regulations on the grounds that they
were beyond the federal regulatory authority.2 6 Following this, Con-
gress created the Federal Child Abuse Amendments of 1984.27 States
agreed to ensure that all newborn children were protected against dis-
crimination on the basis of disability as a condition of receiving fed-
eral child abuse prevention funds to set up systems, including infant
care review committees.28
The Baby Doe controversy and following Amendments produced
a pendulum effect in terms of moving the focus of decision-making in
these cases from parents to the child. 29 The Baby Doe "treat at all
costs approach" was one that demanded physicians to "do everything
possible to save the life regardless of severity of disease, degree of suf-
fering, or probability of success." 30 Although this approach guarantees
that no infant will ever be under-treated, it also guarantees that some
dying infants will suffer the abuse of over-treatment. 31
This scenario is illustrated by the case of Baby Andrew.32 An-
drew's parents, Robert and Peggy Stinson, wrote an article chronicling
"what can happen when a baby becomes hopelessly entrapped in an
intensive care unit where the machinery is more sophisticated than
the code of law and ethics governing its use." 33 Doctors at the hospital
treating Andrew refused to follow the parents' wishes to let their fif-
teen week premature son die a natural death, even though in the early
1980s infants in his category had less than a five percent chance of
survival. 34 For six months, the Stinsons helplessly stood by and
watched their son's prolonged suffering as the doctors treated An-
drew for a brain hemorrhage, respiratory failure, necrosis of the right
leg, gangrene, rickets, multiple bone fractures, retrolental fibroplais,
blindness, and finally pulmonary hypertension. 35
The best interest standard is the result of changing public senti-
ment over providing treatment of doubtful value regardless of cost
25. See Extreme Prematurity, supra note 17, at 33.
26. See Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Assoc., 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
27. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5102 (West Supp. 2004) (repealed 1993).
28. See Extreme Prematurity, supra note 17, at 33.
29. See Ethical Issues, supra note 14, at 532.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. Robert & Peggy Stinson, On the Death of a Baby, 7 J. OF MED. ETHICS 5, 5 (1981).
34. See id. at 7.
35. Ethical and Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 82.
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since the Baby Doe Amendments.3 6 As applied to infants, it can be
defined as incorporating quality of life considerations and dictates
that "infants should be treated with life-sustaining therapy, except
when: (1) the infant is dying; (2) treatment is medically contraindi-
cated; and (3) continued life would be worse for the infant than an
early death. ' 37 Implicit in the best interest standard is that parents do
not have an absolute right to refuse or require medical treatment for
their infants. 38 If the focus is on the patient as a person-one who can
experience both pain and benefit-the standard for treatment should
be what best serves his or her interest.39
Treatment decisions fall into three categories: (1) the mandatory
category; (2) the unwarranted category; and (3) the optional cate-
gory. The best interest of the child standard is most easily applied to
cases when an infant's prognosis is certain, making treatment either
mandatory or unwarranted. 40 Care falls into the unwarranted category
when medical treatment would be futile because there is no chance of
survival. Care falls into the mandatory category when the chances of
survival are high. The optional category, however, where prognoses
are unclear, as is the case with premature, very low birth weight in-
fants, makes the best interest standard more difficult to apply.
B. Mandatory Category
Under the best interest standard, treatment is mandatory when
there is a relatively low risk and a high likelihood that intervention
would save the life of the child. 41 In a case similar to the Baby Doe
Bloomington case, a child commonly referred to as the John Hopkins
Baby42 was born with Down Syndrome and duodenal atresia, a defect
blocking the intestine, which could be corrected by a simple opera-
tion.43 At the request of the parents, who were concerned about the
"financial and emotional burden on the rest of the family," the baby
was left untreated and was allowed to starve to death over an eleven
36. See Robin W. Doroshow et al., Treatment Decisions for Newborns at the Threshold of
Viability, 20 J. PERINATOLOGY 379, 380 (2000).
37. Id.
38. See Ethical and Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 81.
39. See Ethical Issues, supra note 14, at 534.
40. See Leigh Hopper, No Easy Calls When Baby Is Terminally Ill, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb.
9, 2005, at Al, A6.
41. See Ethical and Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 81-82.
42. This child is referred to as the John Hopkins' baby because he was born at the
John Hopkins Hospital. See id.
43. SeeJames M. Gustafson, Mongolism, Parental Desires, and the Right to Life, 16 PERSPEC-
TIVES BIOLOGY & MED. 529, 529 (1973).
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day period.44 This tragic example clearly violated the best interest of
the child standard, but was instrumental in shifting the prior consen-
sus that parents had absolute discretion in decision-making to one
that focuses on the infants and his or her interests.
C. Unwarranted Category
When there is little to no chance of survival compared to the
large burden and pain that aggressive treatment will impose on an
infant, there is no obligation to subject the infant to advanced medical
procedures. 45 As evidenced by Baby Andrew, in many cases treatment
is unwarranted because over-treating infants causes unnecessary suf-
fering by postponing death or prolonging life with devastating disabil-
ities. 46 An anencephalic baby provides an example of a situation
where there is a clear prognosis and treatment is unwarranted. A state-
ment by the Medical Task Force on Anencephaly generally described
the condition as "a congenital absence of a major portion of the brain,
skull, and scalp."47 The Task Force reported that the medical conse-
quences of anencephaly can be established with some certainty. 48 All
anencephalics by definition are permanently unconscious because
they lack the cerebral cortex necessary for conscious thought.49
Therefore, it would be in the child's best interest to discontinue ag-
gressive treatment and allow the child to die, as there is no hope for
recovery.
D. Optional Category
The best interest standard is not as easily applied where prog-
noses are unclear. The prognosis for infants born prematurely and
with very low birth weight commonly falls into a gray area of uncer-
tainty because the expected outcomes for these infants span the entire
range of severe handicap to normal.50 In dealing with infants in this
uncertain category, treatment should be optional with discretion
given to parents, who are in the best position to decide what is in their
child's best interest. The physician or neonatologists' role is to convey
44. See id.
45. See Ethical and Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 81.
46. Mia W. Doron et al., Delivery Room Resuscitation Decisions for Extremely Premature In-
fants, 102 PEDIATRICS 574, 574 (1998).
47. See The Med. Task Force on Anencephaly, The Infant with Anencephaly, 322 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 669, 669 (1990).
48. See id. at 670.
49. In the Matter of Baby "K," 16 F.3d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1994).
50. See Doroshow et al., supra note 36, at 380.
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to parents their medical opinion of the child's prognosis so that par-
ents can make informed decisions. Nevertheless, society has a duty to
intervene when parents make decisions that no longer are in the
child's best interest.51
Before Miller, the law was consistent with the optional category, as
it expected parents to be their child's surrogate decision-makers and
authorized them to make choices and grant consent for medical treat-
ment.52 The United States Supreme Court recognized the pre-existing
state-law framework governing the provision of medical care to handi-
capped infants, which vests primary decisional responsibility in the
parents, subject to review by the state in exceptional cases.5 3 Courts
have consistently upheld parents' rights to serve as surrogate decision-
makers for their children, stating that parents are better suited than
health care professionals to act on behalf of their child's best inter-
est.54 "The expectation is that it is both legitimate and anticipated that
parents, once informed of the risks of marked prematurity, are the
ones to make the decision on whether or not to utilize aggressive in-
terventions or to provide 'comfort care' for their child. '55 After the
Miller court's holding that emergent circumstances is the exception to
the general rule of liability for a physician who treats a minor without
parental consent,56 treatment decisions falling in the optional cate-
gory become one for physicians and not parents. Decision-making
without parental involvement runs the risk of decision-making that vi-
olates the best interest standard.
H. The Case-Miller v. HCA, Inc.
A. Baby Sidney's Story
Baby Sidney was born with an uncertain prognosis, and her par-
ents were given no decision-making authority regarding her best inter-
51. See Ethical Issues, supra note 14, at 536.
52. Frank I. Clark, Intensive Care Treatment Decisions: The Roots of Our Confusion, 94 PEDI-
ATRICS, July 1994, at 98, 100 (citing Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Assoc., 476 U.S. 610 (1986)).
53. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Assoc., 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986).
54. Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
55. Emergent Circumstances, supra note 11, at 340. The 1995 joint report of the Ameri-
can Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Fetus and Newborns and the American College
of Obstetrics and Gynecologists Committee on Obstetric Practice also supports parental
decision-making. "Decisions regarding obstetric management must be made by the parents
and their physicians if the neonate's prognosis is uncertain .... ." Perinatal Care, supra note
5, at 975.
56. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 761 (Tex. 2003).
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ests. 57 On August 17, 1990, Karla Miller was admitted to Woman's
Hospital of Texas ("Hospital") with symptoms of premature labor, ap-
proximately four months before her due date.5 8 After administering a
drug to stop labor, Karla's physicians learned that she had a life-
threatening infection that required them to induce labor.59 According
to an ultrasound, the baby girl was at an estimated gestational age of
twenty-three weeks and weighed approximately 629 grams, or 11/4
pounds. 60 Dr. Jacobs, the attending obstetrician, and Dr. Kelley, a ne-
onatologist, warned that if the baby survived, she would suffer severe
impairments, and that they had never seen such a premature infant
live. 61 The doctors told the Millers that anything they did to sustain
the infant's life would be guesswork. 62 Karla and her husband, Mark,
orally asserted that they would like no heroic measures performed on
their baby after she was born. 63 This request, however, prompted a
series of meetings with hospital administrators and physicians.64 The
director of the Hospital and several physicians then met with Mark,
and the administrators announced there would be a neonatologist
present at the delivery to evaluate the baby before deciding whether
to attempt resuscitation because denying treatment without an evalua-
tion would be below the standard of care. 65 After the meeting, hospi-
tal administrators asked Mark to sign a consent form allowing
resuscitation according to the hospital's plan, but he refused and
asked how he could prevent resuscitation. 66 He was told by hospital
administrators that the Millers could go to another hospital, but this
was not a viable option given Karla and her unborn child's
condition. 67
That night, Sidney Ainsley Miller was born alive and weighed over
500 grams. Sidney's actual gestational age was twenty-three and one-
seventh weeks. 68 Dr. Otero performed life-sustaining procedures on
Sidney69 by immediately "bagging"70 and "intubating 71 her and then
57. Id. at 758.
58. Id. at 761.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 761-62.
62. Id. at 762.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 763.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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placing her on a ventilator. 72 Within the first two days after birth, Sid-
ney suffered a brain hemorrhage.7 3 She survived and as predicted suf-
fers from severe physical and mental impairments.7 4 The trial record
states that at the time of trial:
Sidney was seven years old and could not walk, talk, feed herself, or
sit up on her own. The evidence demonstrated that Sidney was le-
gally blind, suffered from severe mental retardation, cerebral palsy,
seizures, and spastic quadriparesis in her limbs. She could not be
toilet-trained and required a shunt in her brain to drain fluids that
accumulate there and needed care twenty-four hours a day. The
evidence further demonstrated that her circumstances will not
change. 75
B. The Milers's Legal Battle
The Millers sued the hospital for treating Sidney without their
consent under the common law doctrine of battery.76 They also
claimed that the hospital was negligent for having policies and taking
action that allowed treatment of Sidney without consent.77 The Mill-
ers's claims stemmed from their allegations that despite their instruc-
tions to the contrary, the hospital not only resuscitated Sidney but
performed experimental procedures and administered experimental
drugs without which, in all reasonable medical probability, Sidney
would not have survived. 78 A jury found that the hospital was grossly
negligent and acted with malice. 79 The jury awarded the Millers over
$60 million in actual and punitive damages. 80 The appellate court,
however, reversed the trial court decision, reasoning that under the
Natural Death Act,8 1 a parent has no right to refuse treatment unless
70. Bagging is defined as giving breaths using a hand held bag instead of a ventilator.
See Calgary Health Region Neonatology Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.calgary
healthregion.ca/neonatology/FAQ.comprob-glossary.htm (last visited Jun. 22, 2005).
71. To intubate is to pass a special tube into the nose or mouth into the windpipe
(trachea), to help air and oxygen reach the lungs. See id.
72. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 763.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 764.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 761. For a discussion of battery, see infra Part III.A.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 764.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.031-051 (Vernon 2001). The Natural
Death Act (now called the "Advance Directives Act") allows parents to withhold medical
treatment from a child whose medical condition is certifiably terminal. That right does not
extend to children with non-terminal impairments, deformities, or disabilities, regardless
of their severity. Id.
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the patient is "certifiably terminal."8 2 The court held that Sidney was
not, and the Millers received nothing.8 3
The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeal's deci-
sion in favor of the hospital.8 4 Unlike the court of appeals, however,
the Texas Supreme Court refused to apply the Natural Death Act be-
cause it "does not impair or supersede any legal right an individual
may have to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in a lawful
manner."8 5 Instead, the Supreme Court held that a nonconsensual
touching is not a battery when it falls under the emergent circum-
stances exception.8 6 Emergency circumstances are present when
death is likely to result immediately upon failure to treat.8 7 The court
reasoned that Sidney's birth presented the Hospital with an emergent
circumstance because the parents withheld consent, and there was no
time for the Hospital to consult further with the parents or seek a
court order.88 Therefore, under Miller, emergent circumstances pro-
vides an exception to the general rule that a nonconsensual touching
is a battery, relieving hospitals of any and all liability for battery and
negligence claims if they resuscitate premature infants even without
parental consent.
I. Analysis
The holding in Miller poses a danger that physicians might read
the decision as mandating the resuscitation of all newborns showing
any signs of life regardless of probable outcome or parental input.
This unlimited rule is problematic because a standard practice of this
nature conflicts with the medically and legally accepted standard that
treatment decisions should be made in the child's best interest.
A. The Emergent Circumstances Exception Is in Conflict with
Legal Precedent
Miller has been called "a landmark ruling, one that marks a radi-
cal shift in the common law understanding of battery."8 9 Miller ex-
pands the informed consent doctrine and disregards the parents'
82. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 761.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 771.
86. Id. at 761.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Emergent Circumstances, supra note 11, at 339.
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right to be the presumed decision-makers for their children. In doing
so, the Miller court is in conflict with legal doctrine and United States
Supreme Court precedent in holding that Sidney's resuscitation was
an exception to the general rule that a physician commits a battery by
providing medical treatment without consent.
Using the common law notion that a nonconsensual touching is a
battery, Justice Benjamin Cardozo ruled in the 1914 New York case of
Schloendoff v. Society of New York Hospital,90 that physicians are required
to obtain consent before "touching" a patient.91 The doctrine of in-
formed consent, requiring that permission be obtained before provid-
ing medical treatment, is based on the patient's right to receive
information adequate for her (or her surrogate) to exercise an in-
formed decision to accept or refuse treatment.
Tandem with the right to give informed consent before a physi-
cian may treat is the opposite right to withhold consent, even if with-
holding consent would lead to their death. 92 Since the patients' rights
movement in the 1960s, the vast weight of federal and state law has
supported patient autonomy in medical decision-making. 93 Although
it is acceptable for people to refuse consent for treatment that ulti-
mately brings about their own death, it is a different situation when
others do it for them. Newborns, never having the capacity to give
informed consent, present a new dilemma to the doctrine since the
patient is not able to communicate her wishes.
The standard for informed consent is explained in Canterbury v.
Spence.9 4 In Canterbuy, a patient submitted to an operation without
being informed of the risks of paralysis and subsequently suffered pa-
ralysis.95 The court explained that a physician's duty to impart infor-
mation to a patient includes "generally informing the patient in non-
technical terms as to what is at stake: the therapy alternatives open to
him, the goals expectably to be achieved, and the risks that may en-
sure from particular treatment and no treatment."9 6 The court in Can-
90. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
91. See id. at 93.
92. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding a Missouri
state law requiring clear and convincing evidence before withdrawing medical treatment
from an incompetent patient constitutional). The opinion is presumed by many authori-
ties to recognize a constitutionally protected liberty interest to refuse unwanted medical
treatment. See generally BARRY R. FuRROW ET AL., BIOETHICS (5th ed. 2004).
93. See Mia Wechsler Doron & Dana Wechsler Linden, Eyes of Texas Fasten on Life,
Death and the Premature Infant, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2002, at F5.
94. See 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
95. Id. at 776.
96. Id. at 782 n.27.
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terbury noted that there is an exception to this requirement of
informed consent when individuals are unconscious or unable to ex-
press consent.97
This exception is derived from Moss v. Rishworth,98 in which a
child was treated without the parent's consent. Moss held that emer-
gent circumstances allow the physician to forgo consent to operate on
a minor "when death is likely to result immediately upon failure to
perform" treatment.9 9 This exception-the emergent circumstances
exception-was used by the Texas Supreme Court to justify Sidney's
treatment over the objections of her parents. The court stated that in
emergent circumstances, "the harm from failing to treat outweighs
any harm threatened by the proposed treatment, because the harm
from failing to provide life-sustaining treatment under emergent cir-
cumstances is death."100 Applying this to Sidney, being a newborn in-
capable of consenting, the court pointed to evidence that Sidney
would have died without treatment and therefore found the harm
from a failure to treat was imminent and outweighed any harm
threatened by the proposed treatment. 10 1
The court, however, was very explicit that the physician's action
was not based on the doctrine of "presumed consent" because there
could not be a presumption that the patient (or parental proxy)
would have consented when the Millers explicitly refused consent.10 2
The Miller court reasoned that if parents withhold consent, the excep-
tion can still arise in emergent circumstances when there is no time to
consult the parents or seek court intervention. 10 3 Miller proposes, for
the first time in American jurisprudence, a broadening of the emer-
gent circumstances doctrine to the point of allowing a physician to
treat a patient without consent, actual or presumed. 0 4
As the Miller court noted, the United States Supreme Court has
held that the custody, care, and nurture of an infant resides with the
parents and that parents are the presumed decision-makers for
97. Id. at 788-89.
98. Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920).
99. Id.
100. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 768 (Tex. 2003).
101. See id. at 3 768-70 (citing Gravis v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., 427 S.W.2d 310,
311 (Tex. 1968); Moss, 222 S.W.2d at 226-27).
102. See Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 768; see also Emergent Circumstances, supra note 11, at 338.
103. See Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 768.
104. See Emergent Circumstances, supra note 11, at 338.
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newborns. 10 5 Parham v. J.R.10 6 recalls the consistently followed histori-
cal jurisprudence of "broad parental authority over minor children,"
recognizing that "natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the
best interests of their children."10 7 Nevertheless, parents' constitu-
tional rights are subject to limitations. In Bowen v. American Hospital
Association,108 the United States Supreme Court acknowledged paren-
tal decision-making authority and its limits. "[A]s long as parents
choose from professionally accepted treatment options the choice is
rarely reviewed in court and even less frequently supervened."10 9 State
interference in such instances occurs only when parents "have made
decisions that evidence substantial lack of concern for the child's in-
terests." 110 Children fall under the parens patriae power of the state,
which allows states to "punish parents whose conduct has amounted
to abuse or neglect of their children" and "may also supervene paren-
tal decisions before they become operative to ensure that the choices
made are not so detrimental to a child's interests as to amount to
neglect and abuse." '
The newly expanded emergent circumstances exception articu-
lated by the Miller court goes against United States Supreme Court
precedent and common law notions of battery and informed consent.
Miller removed parents, who are in the best position to decide what is
in their child's best interest, from the primary decision-making role in
the treatment of seriously ill newborns in the optional category.
105. See Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 766 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)); see
also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Troxel v. Granville 530 U.S. 57, 65
(2000).
106. 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
107. Id.
108. 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
109. See id. at 628 n.13.
110. See id. The Court notes that "[allthough societal involvement usually occurs under
the auspices of governmental instrumentalities-such as child welfare agencies and
courts-the American legal system ordinarily relies upon the private initiative of individu-
als, rather than continuing governmental supervision, to bring the matter to the attention
of legal authorities."
111. See id. at 628 n.13. The meaning of the term "abuse and neglect" has varied over
time and has rarely been the subject of careful legislative definition. The difficulties stem-
ming from two legal doctrines-respect for parental discretion and protection of children
against harm-may partially account for the dispute over the meaning of the terms; See
President's Comm'n, supra note 8, at 213.
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B. Expanding the Emergent Circumstances Exception to Avoid
Tort Liability Does Not Serve the Child's Best Interest
In basing its decision on the emergent circumstances exception,
the Texas Supreme Court relieved the Hospital from enormous liabil-
ity-close to $60 million-in a tort and negligence action. The court
hastily used an exception to cast aside the necessary consent in order
to avoid a precedent that would open hospitals up to this type of liabil-
ity. Instead, the court should have ensured good policy for the compli-
cated ethical issues surrounding the treatment of very low birth weight
infants by evaluating the case using the best interest of the child stan-
dard. Miller should not be relied upon by courts or physicians for gui-
dance in making treatment decisions for very low birth weight infants.
C. Alternatives to Emergent Circumstances Lead to Bad Policy
In criticizing the majority decision, the dissenting appellate judge
in the Miller case argued that no emergency existed that would excuse
the Hospital's treatment of Sidney without the parents' consent or a
court order overriding their refusal to consent. 112 The dissenting
judge further argued that there could be no court-based finding of
emergent circumstances because there was sufficient time between
the meeting at the hospital and Sydney's birth to inform the Millers of
the alternatives of changing hospitals or seeking outside judicial re-
view.1 13 The court found an exception based on circumstances that
did not exist, attempting to circumvent the requirements of the emer-
gent circumstances exception. This exception will lead to bad policy
regarding treatment decisions of very low birth weight infants because
it forces parents to choose between switching hospitals and seeking
outside judicial review or staying at the present hospital.
The option to change hospitals can be a serious health issue for
mothers in Karla's position. For instance, at the time Karla learned
that the Hospital was not going to honor her refusal to consent to
Sidney's treatment, she was hospitalized and had a life-threatening in-
fection.1 14 Thus, the option to seek care in another hospital was not
one realistically available to her. Encouraging this type of policy is not
in the best interest of the child because it is dangerous to both the
health of the mother and the unborn child that she is carrying. Medi-
112. See HCA, Inc. v. Miller, 36 S.W.3d 187, 197-98 (Tex. App. 2000) (Amidei, J.,
dissenting).
113. See id.
114. See Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 761.
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cal attention and care must be the priority during a high risk labor
situation. Having an emergent circumstances standard that could im-
pose unwanted treatment, which could only be avoided by seeking
care in another facility, is "an abandonment of both the mother and
the child to the ravages of an untended to birth."115
Furthermore, judicial review of treatment decisions for newborns,
such as those the Millers faced, where treatment should be optional,
does not comport with the best interests of the child. Both the Ameri-
can Academy of Pediatrics and the President's Commission for the
Study of Bioethical Problems in Medicine recommend that institu-
tional hospital ethics committees review borderline decisions, 116 par-
ticularly when there is disagreement or uncertainty about whether the
child's interest requires treatment. 117 Parents' decisions in difficult
cases are best reviewed by an in-house, broadly based, multidiscipli-
nary hospital ethics committee because that committee is familiar with
community standards, as opposed to courts, which are removed from
clinical situation and are less familiar with those community
standards. 118
Judicial review of this nature should be used only as a last resort,
when the parent or physician is blatantly acting out of line with the
child's best interest-for example where parents demand or refuse
treatment for a child in the mandatory or unwarranted categories-
and when hospital ethics committees are unable to resolve the issue.
At this point, the child can be referred to the court for the appoint-
ment of a legal guardian who would be empowered to evaluate op-
tions and make decisions in the best interest of the child.1 19 The
policy put forth in the Miller case and the other cases presented in this
Note, make clear that judicial interventions provide no guarantee of
consistency among the courts, or practical policy guidelines to see that
the best interest of the child standard is followed. Court proceedings
are long, invasive, expensive, and insensitive to the agonizing and inti-
mate experience of medical decision-making-especially as applied to
115. John J. Paris & Frank Reardon, Bad Cases Make Bad Law: HCA v. Miller Is Not a
Guide for Resuscitation of Extremely Premature Newborns, 21 J. oF PERINATOLOGY 541, 543 (2001)
(discussing the mother in the case Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding Mem'l Hosp., 247 S.E.2d
457 (Ga. 1981), who fled the hospital to avoid an unwanted court authorized caesarian
section).
116. For example, where parents demand or refuse treatment for a child in the
mandatory or unwarranted categories.
117. Extreme Prematurity, supra note 17, at 37; Perinatal Care, supra note 5, at 975.
118. See Ethical Issues, supra note 14, at 536.
119. See id.
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the case of seriously ill newborns. Moreover, "[s]ome maintain that
judges have no special competence to exercise judgment about com-
plex matters in which difficult moral issues are intertwined with com-
plicated medical considerations."1 20 Therefore, parents should be
afforded primary decision-making authority and when parents exer-
cise that prerogative in a way that may not be in the infant's best inter-
est, society should intervene in order to serve the best interest of the
child.
D. There Is a Particular Need for Consent When Embarking on
Experimental Medical Procedures
The need for parental consent before treating Baby Sidney is
even more compelling given that the proposed treatment was experi-
mental in nature. Although the survival rate for very low birth weight
infants has been improving, there is insufficient data regarding the
cost of initial and ongoing care of these infants and the long-term
outcome of survivors. 121 Treatment decisions of very low birth weight
babies, such as Sidney, have been called "so new... and so unproven
that it is an 'innovative' or 'experimental' procedure." 122 The facts of
the Miller case show that the physicians had never seen such a prema-
ture infant live and told the parents that anything they did to sustain
the infant's life would be "guesswork."'123 The Millers's claim stemmed
from their allegations that the Hospital performed experimental pro-
cedures and administered experimental drugs. 124
International regulation of research involving human subjects
through the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki neces-
sarily conditions patient-in this case parental-consent before em-
barking on experimental, investigational, or research based
treatment.125 A 1988 study (two years prior to Sidney's birth) byJohn
Lantos and his colleagues at the University of Chicago found that not
one of thirty-eight very low birth weight infants who received CPR in
the first seventy-two hours of life survived.' 26 Four of the eleven very
low birth weight infants who received CPR after the first seventy-two
120. Imperiled Newborns, supra note 3, at 19.
121. See Perinatal Care, supra note 5, at 976.
122. John D. Lantos et al., Survival After Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in Babies of Very
Low Birth Weight, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 91-95 (1988).
123. See Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 761-62.
124. Id. at 764.
125. See FuRROW ET AL., supra note 92, at 408, 447.
126. See Lantos et al., supra note 121, at 93-94 (evaluating outcome in terms of survival
until hospital discharge or death).
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hours survived, but three of the four had residual neurological defi-
cits. 12 7 The researchers concluded that since the survival rates are so
low, CPR should not be considered a validated treatment in this popu-
lation and should only be administered upon advanced informed con-
sent to experimental treatment. 128 Although Sidney did not receive
CPR, the treatment she did receive was an experimental procedure
that was embarked upon by her doctors before her parents gave the
appropriate medical consent. Medical professionals have ethical obli-
gations to protect vulnerable patients from clinical trials.129 For exper-
imental procedures on neonates to be in the best interest of the
patient, consent must be obtained only after discussion with the par-
ents about the outcome data and futility of aggressive intervention. 130
IV. Decision-Making Guidelines
To prevent another outcome as in Miller, universal guidelines
should be adopted in practice by physicians and followed by courts to
address problems with medical decision-making for seriously ill
newborns with an uncertain prognosis. If these guidelines are used
properly and applied consistent with the child's best interest, fewer
cases will end up requiring judicial review. If cases do end up in the
courts, the guidelines would help allow for more consistency to
emerge in the courts. The special Hastings Center project on neonatal
ethics outlines three approaches to responding to uncertainty in neo-
natal medicine: (1) the statistical approach; (2) the wait until certainty
approach; and (3) the individualized approach.13 1 Instead of follow-
ing the Miller court's reliance on the emergent circumstances excep-
tion, which utilizes the wait until certainty approach, hospitals should
adopt the individualized approach because it is most in line with the
best interests of the child.13 2
127. See id.
128. See id. at 94-95.
129. See id. at 95.
130. See id.
131. See Imperiled Newborns, supra note 3, at 11.
132. The Hastings Center Project endorses the individualized approach. See Imperiled
Newborns, supra note 3, at 13.
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A. Approaches for Responding to Uncertainty in Neonatal
Medicine
1. Statistical Approach
The first approach is a purely statistical one, allowing physicians
to make an "across-the-board determination that infants in a particu-
lar statistical profile are unlikely to benefit from treatment and that it
should therefore not be initiated for them. ' 133 The problem with this
approach is that it allows some babies to die who could have thrived
and reduces these difficult decisions with far reaching implications to
decisions about infants in general and not on the individual infant's
prognoses.1 3 4 Therefore, this approach is not in line with the best in-
terest of the child standard. For instance, in Sidney's case,just the fact
that she was at twenty-three weeks gestation would be enough to put
her in the unwarranted category without any inquiry into her progno-
sis, assessment after birth, or discussion among the doctors and par-
ents regarding her specific best interests.
2. Wait Until Certainty Approach
The second approach, wait until certainty, is generally employed
by physicians and hospitals in the United States. 135 Under this ap-
proach, treatment is initiated for every infant that is even potentially
viable, and treatment is continued until it is certain that the either the
child will die, or that the parents could legitimately opt for termina-
tion of treatment.13 6 This approach's most positive feature is that it
ensures every infant who could survive is treated.1 37
However, the wait until certainty approach is also flawed because
it may not take the best interest of the child into account. Waiting for
certainty in an area pervasive with uncertainty "may result in
mandatory treatment of infants who end up with an extremely painful
or minimal existence. '1 3 8 Very low birth weight survivors often have
significant physical and mental handicaps, including blindness,
hydrocephalus, cerebral palsy, limited use of language, and learning
disabilities. 139 Others, such as Baby Andrew, suffer a prolonged and
133. Id. at 11.
134. See id. at 12-13.
135. See id. at 11. See also Nancy K. Rhoden, Treating Baby Doe: The Ethics of Uncertainty,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., Aug. 1996, at 34, 35.
136. Imperiled Newborns, supra note 3, at 11.
137. Id. at 12.
138. Id.
139. See Extreme Prematurity, supra note 17, at 34.
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painful dying process.1 40 "Waiting for near certainty ignores informa-
tion, abuses basic principles of probability, and denies the ethical
complexity of these decisions."' 14 1
Another danger in this approach is that as long as there is uncer-
tainty, decisions regarding treatment are considered medical rather
than ethical. Medical decisions are completely left up to the physician,
reducing the role of the parents, the legally presumed decision-mak-
ers for their children, to that of onlookers.1 42
The Miller court followed a wait until certainty approach. The
court based its holding on the reasoning that premature infants could
not be fully evaluated for medical treatment until birth, and any pa-
rental decision prior to birth would be based on "speculation" and
would not be "fully informed."'143 The court found a medical emer-
gency even though both parents were in the delivery room and had
expressed wishes to withhold treatment prior to delivery. However,
the court assumed there was-and always is-no time in the post-de-
livery decision-making moment for parental input on whether or not
to resuscitate, and the only factor in the decision is the physician's
judgment on the potential viability of the infant. 144
It appears the court embraces the wait until birth approach so
that the baby can be "properly evaluated," in order to give certainty to
the prognosis in cases of early gestational age infants.1 45 Only after an
evaluation that uncovers absolute certainty in prognosis will the court
legitimize any decision to withhold treatment. However, the studies
on extremely premature and low birth weight infants show that their
prognoses are inherently uncertain and all decision-making regarding
treatment, even after birth, is based on speculation.1 46
Agreeing with the Miller court's rationale that assessment of the
child cannot be possible until birth, ethicistJohn A. Robertson writes
that "[d] octors and hospitals should be legally free to have neonatolo-
gists resuscitate and treat for a limited period after birth to assess the
child's capacity regardless of parental consent or orders not to resusci-
tate."147 This approach fails because it leaves no room to make ajudg-
ment based on the child's best interest and prognosis, no matter how
140. See Stinson, supra note 33, at 5.
141. Ethical Issues, supra note 14, at 533.
142. See id.
143. See Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 769 (Tex. 2003).
144. See Emergent Circumstances, supra note 11, at 341.
145. See Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 769.
146. See Emergent Circumstances, supra note 11, at 341.
147. Extreme Prematurity, supra note 17, at 32, 38.
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uncertain. Instead, it endorses "[t]rying to resuscitate all potentially
salvageable newborns indifferent to the known data on mortality and
morbidity.' 48 Robertson's article has been criticized as requiring re-
suscitation of all infants without regard to pre-delivery assessment of
gestational age and weight.1 49
In Sidney's case, for example, the Millers were told that "the in-
fant had little chance of being born alive," that "they had never had
such a premature infant live," and that if she were born alive she
"would most probably suffer severe impairments."'150 Sidney had an
uncertain, very poor prognosis, yet she was aggressively treated despite
the Miller's request that no heroic measures be performed. Sidney, as
a very low birth weight infant, was in the optional category of treat-
ment. The wait until certainty approach is faulty because it forces phy-
sician initiated treatment until decision-making is clear cut. Since the
Millers only had a probable outcome for Sidney's prognosis and not
certainty, the wait until certainty approach prevented them from mak-
ing the decision to end treatment, the decision they believed was in
the best interest of their child.
3. Individualized Approach
The third approach, the individualized approach, is the superior
method for decision-making that is in the best interest of the child.
The individualized approach is an intermediate approach that, similar
to the wait until certainty approach, begins treatment for every infant,
"but [also] allow[s] parents the option of termination of treatment
before it is absolutely certain that a particular infant will . . .die."'15 1
The approach depends on probabilities rather than "wait[ing] for
near-certainty in an area characterized by pervasive uncertainty." 152
Doctors try to obtain as much information as possible about a particu-
lar infant's probable prognosis by taking into account factors or other
indicators of probable neurological impairment. 153
This approach involves parents in the decision-making process,
respecting their rights and acknowledging the presumption that the
decisions that the parents make will be in their child's best interest.
The individualized approach encourages discussion among parents
148. Emergent Circumstances, supra note 11, at 342.
149. Id.
150. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 762.
151. Imperiled Newborns, supra note 3, at 11. See also Emergent Circumstances, supra note 11,
at 341-42.
152. See Imperiled Newborns, supra note 3, at 13.
153. See id. at 11-12.
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and physicians and informed decision-making prior to birth based on
pre-delivery assessment of gestational age and weight. Then, after the
birth of the infant, the parents and physicians jointly reevaluate the
infant's prognosis as compared to the predicted one so that parents
can make an informed decision based on their child's best interest.
As applied to Miller, Sidney was at twenty-three weeks of gestation,
and the Millers were informed that Sidney had "little chance of being
born alive," and that if she were born alive she would most probably
"suffer severe impairments. 1 54 At the time of the birth, even the most
sophisticated NICUs did not have protocols for the care of infants at
Sidney's level of prematurity. 15 5 The "now classic"'156 study of twenty-
two to twenty-five week gestation deliveries from May 1988 to Septem-
ber 1991, represents the standard of care in place at the time of Sid-
ney's birth. 157 It found that none of the infants born at twenty-two
weeks survived, 15% of those born at twenty-three weeks survived, 56%
of those born at twenty-four weeks survived, and 79% of those born at
twenty-five weeks survived.1 58 Of the 15% of infants that survived at
Sidney's gestational age, twenty-three weeks, only 2% did so "without
severe abnormalities on cranial ultrasound." t 59 Sidney's prognosis was
uncertain, placing her in the optional category, within which parents
should be given discretion as to whether or not to treat their infant,
even though there is a slight possibility, 15%, that the child will
survive.160
When dealing with probabilities, there is always the chance that
the wrong decision will be made in an individual case. However, in the
cases of extremely premature infants whose prognoses are inherently
uncertain, probabilities are the only tools the decision-makers have to
work with. In making the treatment decision, it is recommended that
physicians gather as much data as possible on the outcome probabili-
ties of similar infants and discuss resuscitation with the parents before
154. See Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 761-62.
155. See Emergent Circumstances, supra note 11, at 341-42.
156. See id. at 340 (citing Marilee C. Allen et al., The Limits of Viability Neonatal Out-
comes of Infants Born at 22 to 25 Weeks' Gestation, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1597-601 (1993)).
157. See id. at 340.
158. The survival rate in this study was defined as the number of infants born at a given
gestational age who survived six months from birth, divided by the number of infants born
at that gestational age, including stillborn infants. See Marilee C. Allen et al., The Limits of
Viability-Neonatal Outcomes of Infants Born at 22 to 2.5 Weeks'Gestation, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1597, 1598 (1993).
159. See id. at 1599.
160. See Emergent Circumstances, supra note 11, at 341. See also Hopper, supra note 40, at
Al, A6.
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delivery. The decision should be altered if necessary after initial treat-
ment and evaluation at birth, taking into account the possibility of
inaccuracy of predicting gestational age and weight. 161 In its endorse-
ment of the individualized approach, the special Hastings Center pro-
ject on neonatal ethics said:
[A] n individualized approach that seeks a high degree of moral
probability rather than certainty can be embraced with some confi-
dence. As time goes on, physicians do gain more information
about the probable outcome for very premature babies, though of
course in an individual case they can be wrong. The possibility of
error should, we believe, be reason for caution, not an excuse for
mandating aggressive treatment until the bitter end.162
B. The Potential for Relationship Standard
After determining that the individualized approach is the best
suited approach for the best interest of the child, the parents need
criteria for making decisions regarding the treatment of their child.
For instance, Baby Sidney was among the 15% of babies at her gesta-
tional age and weight to survive because of treatment, but not one of
the 2% to survive without severe abnormality on cranial ultrasound.
Even though there is a likelihood of survival, is the fact that it will be
with severe disability enough to justify a parent's cessation of treat-
ment? Richard McCormick, S.J., a Catholic bioethicist, suggests mak-
ing this determination by using a quality of life judgment based on the
potential for human relationship. 163 McCormick, the leading author-
ity on the potential for relationship standard, frames his guidelines in
the Christian tradition, but also provides secular guidelines for deci-
sion-making in the cases of newborns like Sidney. "Translated into the
language of 'best interests,' an individual who lacks any present capac-
ity or future potential for human relationships can be said to have no
interests at all, except perhaps to be free from pain and discom-
fort." 164 He frames the best interest of the child with the proposition
that "life is a value to be preserved only insofar as it contains some
potentiality for human relationships."'165
Therefore, if an individualized approach using a potential for re-
lationship standard was used during the case of the John Hopkins
161. Doroshow et al., supra note 36, at 380-81.
162. Imperiled Newborns, supra note 3, at 13.
163. Richard A. McCormick, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern Medicine, 229
JAMA, 172, 172-76 (1974).
164. Imperiled Newborns, supra note 3, at 15.
165. McCormick, supra note 163, at 175.
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baby,1 66 cessation of treatment would never be in that child's best in-
terest because of the potential for relationship that people with Down
Syndrome have. On the other hand, an anencephalic baby has no po-
tential for relationship and therefore should never be aggressively
treated at birth.
As evidenced by Baby Sidney's condition today, the argument
could be made that she has no potential for relationship. Therefore,
had the Millers been able to withhold treatment using the individual-
ized approach, their decision would have been justifiable. On the
other hand, there is evidence in the Miller case that Sidney smiled and
responded favorably to physical contact. 167 With that evidence, one
could argue that Sidney has some potential for relationship. Sidney's
case demonstrates the lack of absolute certainty in these cases and
highlights the difficulty of these life and death decisions.
It is important to remember, when applying the best interest of
the child standard, that an impaired child does not have the luxury of
comparing his life to a "normal" one, and we should not compare
their life's worth to a healthy child. 168 Therefore, the decision should
be made as objectively as possible and not by the perspective of what
one would consider "normal." In fact, the Miller court avoided this
issue and found a court order unnecessary to override the Miller's
refusal to consent to Sidney's treatment because "a court cannot de-
cide between impaired life versus no life at all."1 69 The court's reluc-
tance to address this issue shows the need for more comprehensive
ethical methodology discussion and awareness of the ethical questions
posed in the NICUs in our nation's hospitals. McCormick addresses
this concern:
This risk of error should not lead to abandonment of decisions; for
that is to walk away from the human scene. Risk of error means
only that we must proceed with great humility, caution, and tenta-
tiveness. Concretely, it means that if err we must at times, it is bet-
ter to err on the side of life-and therefore to tilt in that
direction. 170
166. The John Hopkins Baby was a baby born with Down Syndrome and duodenal
atresia, a defect blocking the intestine, which could be corrected by a simple operation.
Upon request of the parents, the baby was left untreated and allowed to starve to death
over an eleven day period. See Gustafson, supra note 43, at 529.
167. See Extreme Prematurity, supra note 17, at 37.
168. See Imperiled Newborns, supra note 3, at 15.
169. Miller v. HCA, 118 S.W.3d 758, 765 (Tex. 2003).
170. McCormick, supra note 163, at 176.
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Conclusion
Miller was wrongly decided and should not be used by parents,
physicians, or other courts as a model for making treatment decisions
for preterm, very low birth weight infants. Making decisions in a
child's best interest is the agreed upon standard by the medical com-
munity and the United States Supreme Court. The emergent circum-
stances exception to the need for informed consent, which was the
doctrine on which the Miller decision based its holding, is threatening
the best interest of the child standard. The proper approach to mak-
ing decisions in a child's best interest is an individualized approach.
This gives the parents the decision-making authority after conversa-
tions with their physicians, before and after birth, about the probabili-
ties that their child will survive with the potential for human
relationship. The physician, and finally the court, should only inter-
vene in this decision-making if there is strong disagreement as to the
proper course of treatment, and even then, only to ensure that life or
death decisions are ultimately made in the child's best interest.
Summer 2005] EMERGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
1098 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
